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Takeovers in the Boardroom:
Burke Versus Schumpeter
By Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman*
We are delighted to participate in a 25th anniversary assessment of Martin
Lipton's 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom.' This is a remarkably
prescient article that demonstrates an uncanny ear for an emerging issue. From
his vantage point inside targets' boardrooms-and, we assume, also from inside
the nearby offices of investment bankers-Lipton spotted a gathering storm on
the horizon and sought to channel the emerging issue of takeover policy in a
direction that accorded with his own fundamental convictions as well as the
interests of his clients. As every academic knows, early intervention is the surest
way to influence the path of a debate. And as Lipton's career-long commitment
to scholarship demonstrates, he has always had a good bit of the academic in
him.
We begin by examining the worldview behind Takeover Bids. What exactly did
Lipton see from the windows of boardrooms on the upper floors of New York
skyscrapers? When viewed in its original setting, we believe, Lipton's article gives
rise to a profound irony Takeovers Bids reflects a deep disquiet with the market
for corporate control. It is a Burkean take on a messy Schumpeterian world that,
during 1980s, reached its apex in Drexel Burnham's democratization of finance
through the junk bond market. But the irony is that today, long after the Delaware
Supreme Court has adopted many of Lipton's views, there is a new market for
corporate control that no longer poses the threats-or supports the opportuni-
ties-that the market of the 1980s created. Today's strategic bidders and their
targets share the same boardroom views. And for precisely this reason, "just say
no" is no longer the battle cry that it once was. It stirred the crowds in the past
precisely because hostile takeovers could be credibly depicted as a sweeping threat
to the status quo-a claim that no one would make about today's strategic bidders.
Today's hostile bidders no longer possess the disruptive Schumpeterian spirit
of the 1980s that animated the. early purveyors of, to use Lipton's phrase, "two-
* Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School and Stem Professor of Law and
Business, Columbia Law School, and Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. We
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tier, front-end-loaded, boot-strap, bust-up, junk-bond, hostile tender offers."2 The
market for corporate control today is a process of peer review, rather than an
instrument of systemic change. What is lost as a result is just what, in the con-
servative view, has been gained: the capacity of the market for corporate control
to ignite the dynamism that in our view has served the U.S. economy so well.
We undertake our assessment of Lipton's boardroom view with trepidation. We
are reminded of a scene in the movie, Annie Hall, in which Woody Allen and
Diane Keaton, waiting in line to see The Sorrow and the Pity, become a captive
audience for a self-important bore intent on impressing his date by loudly lec-
turing her on Marshall McLuhan's work. In fulfillment of all of our fantasies,
Marshall McLuhan then appears himself to tell the self-anointed expert that he
has got it all wrong. We run an analogous risk in this essay We fully expect Lipton
to disagree with much of what we say about his views, and we will even forego
the post-modem defense that the readers, not the author, are the final arbiters of
a work's meaning.3 Instead, we resort to a lesson from cognitive psychology (a
discipline Lipton has viewed positively in the past4), namely, that our current
positions powerfully shape our recollections of the past-or, put differently, where
we were yesterday depends on where we are today.
In the discussion that follows, Part I places Takeover Bids in its historical context.
Part II then tracks the post-Takeover Bids development of Delaware takeover law,
with particular emphasis on the ongoing dialogue between the Delaware Supreme
Court and the Chancery Court, which we characterize as a continuing *debate
between conservatism and pragmatism. Finally, Part III assesses where takeover
law now stands, and resurrects our perennial optimism that the Chancery Court's
pragmatism will ultimately prevail over the Supreme Court's ideology. We con-
clude, however, that although Lipton may still lose today's battle to allow targets
to just say no to intra-establishment takeovers, he will still have won the larger
war. For now, at least, boardrooms are insulated from much of the force of a truly
Schumpeterian market in corporate control of the sort we briefly glimpsed during
the 1980s.
I. LIPTON'S COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MANIFESTO
The world was a very different place in 1979, the year that Takeover Bids was
published. The economy was just emerging from a decade of dismal performance.
2. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Mergers: Past, Present and Future 3 (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://
www.wrhambrecht.com/comp/ma/guest-column/lipton.imerger.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
3. We note, however, that the use of scholarship by courts makes the post-modem position de-
scriptively accurate, as we learned from the Delaware Supreme Court's changing utterly the meaning
of our term "substantive coercion." Compare Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Inter-
mediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247
(1989) with Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.1990). Vice Chan-
cellor Strine has noted the disconnect between our definition of the term and the manner in which
the Supreme Court has used it, despite the court's acknowledgment of the source of the phrase. See
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
4. Martin Lipton & Paul Rowe, Polls, Pills and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 23-24 (2002).
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Interest rates were high (although they would soon go higher),5 and the Dow was
still below 900.6 Hostile takeovers were increasing, albeit gradually, as they had
since 1974, the first year in which a prominent investment bank advised an
acquirer in a hostile takeover.7 Drexel had not yet begun to finance takeovers with
junk bonds, and the poison pill had yet to be invented. But many of the players
who would come to dominate the hostile financial deals of the next decade were
already active, including T. Boone Pickens, Ronald Perelman, Felix Rohaytn, Jo-
seph Flom, and, of course, Martin Lipton.8
In Takeover Bids, Lipton recognized-perhaps more clearly than anyone else at
the time-just how important the takeover phenomenon would become during
the next decade. Takeover Bids also articulated the central features of a deeply
conservative, even Burkean, view of hostile takeovers, which appears to have
informed much of what Lipton has written-and the Wachtell, Lipton firm has
stood for-during the ensuing twenty-five years.
In our view, Takeover Bids should be read as a bold manifesto for the committed
rather than as a cautious argument to convince the agnostic. But as a call to arms,
it has proven to be more potent than any ordinary law review article could hope
to be. Although Takeover Bids makes many particular arguments, its core is con-
tained in a paragraph that occurs early in the article:
It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue [of whether to permit boards
to oppose hostile bids] as: whether the long-term interests of the nation's cor-
porate system and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators
interested not in the vitality and continued existence of the business enterprise in
which they have bought shares, but only in a quick profit on the sale of those
shares? The overall health of the economy should not in the slightest degree
be made subservient to the interests of certain shareholders in realizing a
profit on a takeover. (Italics in original) 9
The striking feature of this perspective is that it is at once abstract and deeply
conservative. Nothing less than the health of the entire economic system is at
stake. But what is the mechanism by which takeovers jeopardize the health of the
economic system? How do speculators and raiders acquiring less than one percent
5. See Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/data.htm (giving an overnight federal funds rate of 11.2% in 1979).
6. See DowJones and Company, Dow Jones Indexes: Dow Data 1970-1979 (2005), available at http://
djindexes.com/mdsidx/index.cfm?event = showavgDecades&decade = 1970.
7. Morgen-Stanley advised International Nickel Company of Canada on its acquisition of ESB. RON
CHERNOw, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FI-
NANCE 596 (1990).
8. The early players in the mid-1970s world of hostile takeovers are described retrospectively in
CHERNOW, supra note 7, at 596-603. The same world is described contemporaneously in Steven Brill,
Two Tough Lawyers in the Tender-Offer Game, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, June 21, 1976, at 52-61. Lincoln
Caplan recounts that the legendary rivalry between Wachtell, Lipton and Skadden, Arps can be traced
to their first encounter on opposite sides of a proxy contest in 1959. LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN:
POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 59 (1993).
9. Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 104. This paragraph contains the article's only italicized sentence.
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of U.S. public companies in hostile deals (and far less than one percent in 197910)
threaten the entire economic system? We suspect that Takeover Bids describes a
mechanism just clearly enough to inform those who need to know-but not quite
so clearly as to invite critique.
Consider first how hostile takeovers do not endanger the economy They do
not threaten the economic system by harming shareholders or raising the costs
of outside equity capital (although Lipton argues that they may harm long-term
shareholders). Indeed, Takeover Bids reiterates at several points that the case for
allowing boards to defeat hostile bids does not turn centrally on the consequences
for shareholder interests."
Nor does it -seem likely that Lipton's vision of a threat to the economy could
have been rooted in the direct costs that hostile bids might impose on corporate
stakeholders other than shareholders. Accepting for the moment that significant
harm occurs, as Lipton argues,' 2 the numbers of deals were much too small to
have economy-wide consequences during the 1970s. Since we doubt that Lipton
was exaggerating his concerns, harm to stakeholders couldn't have been their
principal source. Moreover, if stakeholder interests had been key to Lipton's con-
cerns, takeover policy would not have been the answer. The problem would have
been management opportunism vis-a-vis stakeholders, and the remedy would
have been to curb the power of all boards, acquirers and targets alike, to restruc-
ture companies at the expense of their stakeholders. For this purpose, it matters
little to employees whether they are fired by incumbent management or by a
hostile bidder.
What, then, is there about hostile takeovers that could shake corporate capi-
talism to its foundations, even before the takeover surge of the 1980s? The answer,
Takeover Bids suggests, is the demoralizing effects of takeovers on corporate man-
agers and directors.
At least two forms of perverse incentives arising from takeover pressures are
discussed in Takeover Bids. One is that managers who fear takeovers might no
longer engage in serious long-term planning,13 apparently out of concern that
their plans might be lost in a hostile takeover or, worse yet, end up lining the
pockets of a raider. The other is that an uncontrolled takeover market would
dissipate a boardroom sense of social responsibility that had slowly accreted over
the previous five decades of legal and social evolution. Faced with an apparent
endorsement of takeovers, directors would conclude that the law's ultimate value
was market price and the interests of speculators, rather than the responsible
treatment of stakeholders or good corporate governance more generally 14 Put
10. There were only seventy-three successful contested tender offers in which the target was a
public company and either the target or the acquirer was listed on the New York or American Stock
Exchanges during the entire 1970s. Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, The Returns to Acquiring
Firms in Tender Offers: Evidencefrom Three Decades, FIN. MGMT, Aug. 1989, at 15.
11. See, e.g., Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 115, 119-20.
12. The empirical evidence would cause one to be skeptical of the factual claim. See RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuisITIONS ch. 13 (2d ed. 1995).
13. See Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 109, 115.
14. Id. at 119.
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differently, the real costs of open takeovers would accrue not in the minority of
companies that were actually acquired but through a pervasive change of values
and temporal perspective within the boardrooms of the vast majority of companies
that were not acquired.' 5
In short, Takeover Bids was a call to arms in the defense of an economic order
built on the honor, perspicuity, and civility of the officers and directors of
America's corporations. The system and its concomitant culture had developed
organically over the preceding five decades.' 6 In Lipton's view, it had functioned
well to ensure that America's corporate resources were invested rationally, and
that the proceeds of growth were distributed equitably between shareholders and
stakeholders. Now, however, the system was put at risk by "ad hoc consortiums"
of selling shareholders who, although they might purport to exercise choice, were
actually manipulated by raiders and speculators. The danger was not that every
company would fall to raiders, but that America's top managers would lose their
vocation as trustees and descend to the short-sighted, cut-throat capitalism of the
raiders. And worse yet, this process of erosion was being legitimated by empty
slogans, such as "shareholder choice."
It is not hyperbolic to call Takeover Bids "Burkean" because, like Edmund
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France,'7 it is an impassioned defense of
ancien regime authored by a powerful mind. And like Reflections on the Revolution
in France, Takeover Bids is remarkably prescient, published several years before
the full import of the takeover revolution became obvious. Nor do the similarities
end there. Where Burke celebrates the French monarchy, aristocracy, 8 and clergy
as the architects of France's prosperity, Lipton celebrates the moral and economic
leadership of America's CEOs, board members, and investment bankers. Where
Burke decries stock jobbers, speculators, and mobs, Lipton's targets are raiders,
speculators, and "ad hoc consortiums" of shareholders. And where Burke rejects
"popular election" as "the sole lawful source of authority,"' 9 Lipton rejects share-
holder choice as the sole basis for deciding the outcome of hostile tender offers.
Even the short-term perspective and lack of attachment to particular companies
15. Here Lipton is making the same kind of general deterrence argument that is proffered by pro-
takeover advocates except that for Lipton the externality is negative. See e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 841-43 (1981).
16. The five-decade time span suggests that the origin of the system was in the reforms of New
Deal legislation in Lipton's view, although Takeover Bids does not make this explicit.
17. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Frank M. Turner ed., 2003)
(1790).
18. Of the French aristocracy threatened by the Revolution, Burke observes:
On my best observation, compared with my best inquiries, I found [the French] nobility for the
greater part composed of men of high spirit, and of a delicate sense of honour, both with regard
to themselves individually, and with regard to their whole corps, over whom they kept, beyond
what is common in other countries, a censorial eye.
Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 23.
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that Lipton sees as characteristic of raiders and arbitrageurs resembles Burke's
earlier critique of France's revolutionary leaders. 20
Finally, like Burke, Lipton never shrank from criticizing the philosophes of the
academy Although Henry Manne's work2 is not mentioned explicitly in Takeover
Bids-and Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel 2 2 Lucian Bebchuk,2 3 and one of
us 24 had not yet written our first articles on the market for corporate control-
some aspects of the economic case for an open takeover market were already
familiar when Takeover Bids was published.
A well-known article by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel published two
years after Takeover Bids25 is the best counterpoint to Lipton's article. Although
Easterbrook and Fischel's contribution was far more linear and analytical than
Lipton's (in the fashion of the philosophes), its abstract approach and systemic
claims matched Lipton's level of discourse perfectly. As modem philosophes to
Lipton's Burkean rhetoric, Easterbrook and Fischel emphasized managerial agency
costs as the central problem of corporate governance, and embraced the hostile
takeover as the market's ultimate disciplinary tool.26 Far from demoralizing offi-
cers and directors, however, the risk of a takeover on this view serves to discipline
them and minimize agency losses that shareholders would otherwise bear. The
legal implication is boards should have no discretion to respond to hostile take-
overs-the mirror image of the legal conclusion that Lipton reached. And, as in
Takeover Bids, the justification was systemic. What mattered for Easterbrook and
Fischel was not the quality of individual takeover bids, but the implications of
takeover policy for the market as a whole and, in particular, for the incentives of
raiders to discover poorly managed companies and the incentives of managers to
maximize shareholder value to avoid a hostile bid. 27
Of course, Lipton's rhetorical struggle with modem philosophes has a different
ending than Burke's struggle with the defenders of the French Revolution. Burke's
views did not prevail (at least in France), while, as we argue below, Lipton suc-
ceeded in blunting the revolutionary edge of hostile takeovers that first appeared
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, Lipton succeeded, we will argue, pre-
cisely because he was able to best the philosophes on their own turf, by casting
the issue of defensive tactics as a matter of general principle, to be decided on
the basis of system-wide costs and benefits. On this view, we must choose to trust
boards or shareholders, market prices or internal evaluations, CEOs or raiders.
Neither Lipton's approach nor its mirror image, the systemic analysis of Easter-
20. Of the French revolutionary leaders, Burke observes, "Their attachment to their country itself
is only so far as it agrees with some of their fleeting projects; it begins and ends with that scheme of
polity which falls in with their momentary opinion." Id. at 75.
21. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
22. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15.
23. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028
(1982).
24. Gilson, supra note 15.
25. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15.
26. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 1168-83.
27. See id. at 1177-79.
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brook and Fischel, left much room to discriminate among hostile takeovers and
defensive tactics. The logic of Lipton's position was to preclude all hostile bids;
the thrust of Easterbrook and Fischel's was to preclude none, at least when the
bid price exceeded the market price of the target's stock. In this sense, both Lipton
and the philosophes abandoned the particularistic, fact-sensitive analysis that is the
hallmark of Delaware corporate law in other contexts. And precisely by diverting
the debate outside the usual plane of analysis in Delaware corporate law, Lipton
(with the unintended aid of the philosophes) won an enormous rhetorical advan-
tage. If the only alternatives were those presented by Takeover Bids and Easter-
brook and Fischel respectively, Delaware's choice-and America's choice-was
never even close.
28
II. TAKEOVERS IN THE BOARDROOM AND THE COURTS: IDEOLOGY
VERSUS PRAGMATISM
If, as we argue, Takeover Bids made a Burkean claim that takeovers erode the
foundations of the U.S. economy, it is hardly surprising that its argument does
not require a close parsing of the experiences of particular takeover battles. In-
deed, it is striking how little the facts about individual control contests and their
consequences matter to Lipton's position. As Lipton put it, "even if there were no
real evidence, but only suspicion, that proscribing the ability of companies to
defend against takeovers would adversely affect long-term planning and thereby
jeopardize the economy, the policy considerations in favor of not jeopardizing the
economy are so strong that not even a remote risk is acceptable.129 Moreover, the
paucity of factual detail did not handicap Lipton's efforts to shape the develop-
ment of Delaware takeover law. As is well-known, Lipton's conservative ideology
ultimately prevailed in the Delaware Supreme Court, albeit not without creating
a tension between the Supreme Court and the Chancery Court that survives in
Delaware corporate law to this day
Matters didn't start out this way, or at least they didn't seem to. In the beginning,
the Supreme Court's approach to the modem wave of hostile takeovers seemed
to be more pragmatic and fact sensitive than based on abstract principles and
systemic reasoning. But appearances are deceiving. The nice irony of the history
is that the inter-court tension seems to have grown out of the fact that in Unocal30
the Supreme Court sandbagged Chancery. Unocal instructed Chancery that the
lawfulness of takeover defenses depends on the facts by inviting it to examine the
nature of the "threat" posed by a hostile offer and the proportionality of the target's
defensive response.31 But when the Chancery Court developed a takeover juris-
prudence based on a fact-sensitive investigation, the Supreme Court announced
28. Lipton's attack on the philosophes continues to the present. See Client Letter from Martin Lipton,
No Substitute for Good Judgment, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (March 24, 2005) (copy on file
with The Business Lawyer).
29. Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 104-05.
30. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
31. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 251.
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that the facts mattered very little. Instead, matters such as the possible confusion
.of target shareholders and the possible disruption of the incumbent board's busi-
ness strategy were threats sufficient to support preclusive takeover defenses.32 By
this point, however, the die was cast. Having been repeatedly exposed to the facts,
the Chancery Court could not ignore the reality of the transactions before it.
Simply deferring to the Supreme Court's post-Unocal embrace of managerial dis-
cretion and Liptonian ideology was no longer completely possible.
As we suggested in Part I, Takeovers Bids anticipated the new class of bidders
that would dominate the market for corporate control in the 1980s. Unocal pro-
vided the Delaware Supreme Court its first opportunity to confront the new wave
of hostile takeovers, fittingly an effort by T. Boone Pickens to profit by restricting
an oil company's misuse of free cash flow.
The court acted against the background of what had become a heated debate.
33
Takeover defense lawyers advanced the position championed by Lipton in Take-
over Bids. Board decisions with respect to hostile takeovers should be treated like
any other acquisition proposal: the business judgment rule should operate to
allocate the decision-making role to directors. As Lipton put it, "[o] nce the direc-
tors have properly determined that a takeover should be rejected they may take
any reasonable action to accomplish this purpose."34 Like the business judgment
rule, the court's deference to managers derives from broad principle, not from the
particular defensive tactic or the takeover.
Academics took the opposite side of the argument. Lipton would accord target
management deference to defeat a takeover because stability encouraged proper
management conduct; academics would restrict that discretion because from their
perspective, hostile takeovers played a disciplinary role. "Speculators" could dis-
place both bad managers and managers who stood in the way of economic change.
Depending on the individual academic, the philosophe position was that target
managers should either be passive-the Easterbrook and Fischel position we re-
visited in Part I-or that these managers should seek out a better deal.35 In the
end, however, the dominant academic position accorded shareholders the final
decision with respect to a takeover proposal, which, like Lipton's analysis, was a
position based on broad principle and systemic effects.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court took the middle path, appearing to
reject a resolution of the issue based on abstract principle by allocating decision-
making responsibility neither entirely to shareholders nor entirely to managers.
Rather, the court adopted a* proportionality test geared to the facts. The Chancery
Court was directed to determine whether the particular hostile bid presented a
threat-was there a real danger or was the board simply parroting Lipton's litany
of possible concerns?36 If there was a threat, was management's defensive response
32. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
33. Ronald J. Gilson, UNOCAL Fifteen Years Later (and what we can do about it), 26 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 491, 493-97 (2001).
34. Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 123.
35. See Gilson, supra note 15; Bebchuk, supra note 23.
36. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955-957.
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proportional to the threat-a balance that presumably turned on the details of
the particular threat and defensive response.
As originally framed, the trial court was cast as the final arbitrator between
good and bad defensive tactics, making a substantive judgment concerning the
presence of a threat and the proportionality of the response rather than simply
deferring to the board's or shareholders' decision based on abstract principle.37
The balance called for the exercise of a pragmatism informed by experience. The
business judgment rule is premised in significant part on the fact that the balance
of experience on day-to-day affairs broadly favors the institutional competency of
the board over that of the court; deference does not depend on the circumstances
of the particular case .3 In hostile takeovers, however, that balance was reversed.
The Chancery Court saw a great many more transactions than could any single
board and, in addition, there was a problem of self-interest. For these reasons
deference would depend on a careful parsing of the facts.
To be sure, one could (and we did) have a healthy skepticism whether the
Supreme Court really meant what it seemed to say in Unocal. Shortly after Unocal,
we followed Lipton's choice of journals and wrote an article for the Business Lawyer
that asked whether there was "substance to proportionality review" 39 Ever the
optimists, we outlined how the Chancery Court might operationalize Unocal's
seemingly pragmatic premise that, once immersed in the facts, the court could
distinguish between good and bad defensive tactics.
For a time, that optimism seemed appropriate. In a series of cases highlighted
by Anderson, Clayton,40 Interco,41 and Pillsbury,42 the Chancery Court developed a
doctrinal framework that took Unocal's call for a pragmatic balance seriously, both
at the level of the threat and at the level of the proportionality test. In Anderson,
Clayton, the court concluded that a defensive response that coerced shareholders
was not proportional to a hostile bid that did not.43 In Interco and Pillsbury, block-
ing an offer, in contrast to providing shareholders with a better alternative, was
not proportional to the threat that shareholders would differ with management's
assessment of the price offered in the hostile bid--what the Supreme Court
would come inaccurately to call "structural coercion."45
The central feature of the Chancery Court's conception of proportionality re-
view was its fealty to Unocal's apparent rejection of abstract principle in favor of
37. In hindsight, we might have read Unocal a little more closely The Supreme Court was explicit
in rejecting Easterbrook & Fischel's passivity principle-it was not, the court stated forcefully, the law
of Delaware. In contrast, the court was kinder to Lipton, rejecting his broad principle implicitly rather
than explicitly as with Easterbrook and Fischel, and referring favorably to Lipton's catalogue of possible
threats. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955 n.10.
38. Gilson, supra note 15, at 822-23.
39. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3.
40. A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
41. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
42. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
43. Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 112-113.
44. Interco, 551 A.2d at 800; Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060.
45. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Del. 1989).
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particularized fact finding. Was the hostile offer coercive? Did target management's
response seek "to explore or create alternatives or attempt to negotiate on the
shareholders' behalf"?46 The result was the development of a pragmatic takeover
jurisprudence in the Chancery Court that proved extremely difficult to suppress.
Pragmatism was the only plausible response if the trial judge was to take seriously
what was being presented in the courtroom. Only a commitment to Lipton's
abstract ideology, not dependent on "real evidence but only on suspicion,"47 could
cause a court to credit, for example, Bruce Wasserstein's ratchet valuations in
Interco,48 or the breadth of his valuation of the post-transaction Time Warner.49 A
blanket license to "just say no" in response to an unsupported claim that the
offered price was too low cannot survive an inquiry that depends on the facts; to
allow such a claim to stand is ideology, not the fact finding approach that that
the Supreme Court seemed to mandate in Unocal.
In short, the Chancery Court took Unocal seriously and constructed a pragmatic
takeover jurisprudence. The sandbag came in Time Warner" and Unitrin,51 where
the Supreme Court retreated to ideology. While one may criticize these decisions
on a variety of grounds, 52 for present purposes their critical characteristic is that
they substitute an abstract principle for the court's obligation to actually assess
the facts of the bid and response before them. In Time Warner, plaintiffs claimed
that Paramount's offer-a cash offer for all outstanding shares, non-coercive be-
cause the minority would be frozen out at the same price-could not support a
defensive tactic that blocked shareholder consideration. The court responded by
simply accepting the target company's assertion that shareholders would mistak-
enly accept the bid; the court demanded no evidence of why the shareholders
would systematically err or why efforts to educate them would fail.53 As Lipton
boldly advanced in Takeover Bids, suspicion alone was sufficient, without any
factual inquiry into. the likelihood or source of shareholder error. This is ideology,
not pragmatism; Burke not Holmes.
Any remaining uncertainty about the Supreme Court's commitment to a fac-
tually based proportionality test disappeared in Unitrin.5 4 In that case, the Chan-
46. City Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d at 799-800.
47. Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 104-105.
48. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792-93, 798-99.
49. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880 at * 13 (Del. Ch. 1989) (noting
that Wasserstein provided several valuations, including one of $208 to $402 per share in 1993,
described by the Chancellor as "a range that a Texan might feel at home on." Id.).
50. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
51. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
52. As a matter of doctrine (as opposed to principle), both opinions are opaque in their reasoning.
In Time-Warner, for example, the Supreme court rejects "Interco and its progeny" for substituting the
court's judgment for that of the board concerning what is a better deal. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153. But the
Chancery Court opinion in Interco involved at most substituting the shareholders' judgment-not the
court's--for that of the board. Unitrin was also doctrinally opaque. The Unitrin framing-a defensive
tactic was not unlawful, even if it precluded a hostile bid, if it did not make the bidder's winning of a
proxy fight "mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable"-had the effect, which the Supreme
Court made no effort to explain, of preferring that control changes take place by means of proxy fights
than tender offers. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388-89; see also Gilson, supra note 33, at 501-02.
53. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153-54.
54. Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651, A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
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cery Court simply determined that on the facts-among other things, the target
already had a pill in place-the creation of further defensive barriers could not
possibly be proportionate to a threat that had already been disarmed. 55 As the
Chancery Court put it, "because the only threat to the corporation is in the in-
adequacy of an opening bid made directly to the board, and the board had already
taken actions that will protect the shareholders from mistakenly falling for a low
ball negotiating strategy, a repurchase program that intentionally provides mem-
bers of the board with a veto of any merger is not reasonably related to the threat
posed by [the bidder's] negotiable all shares, all cash offer."56
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, remanding to the Chancery Court to
determine whether the target's repurchase program was "within a range of rea-
sonable defensive measures." 57 One might think that, had the Supreme Court
accorded the Chancery Court any degree of deference, it would have accepted
the Chancery Court's finding that the repurchase program was not "reasonably
related to the threat posed" because the threat was so mild as implying that the
defensive tactic fell outside a "range of reasonable defensive measures," as the
Supreme Court had reframed the Unocal formulation in Unitrin. However, the
opinion provides evidence that the Supreme Court was rejecting the entire inquiry,
as opposed to merely the factual conclusion. Immediately following Unitrin's di-
rection on remand is a citation to, of all cases, Cheff v. Mathes58 as in accord with
the court's conclusion. Cheff, it will be recalled, was a case in which the Supreme
Court declined to examine the board's justification for defensive tactics at all, and
whose lack of content presumably gave rise to the need to address defensive tactics
in Unocal.59 Cheff also was the case Lipton cited in Takeover Bids to support a broad
grant of discretion to boards.6°
So the Chancery Court was sandbagged. It was told in Unocal to apply an
intermediate standard, somewhere between the business judgment rule and the
entire fairness test, and make its own factual determination of whether a defensive
tactic was reasonably related to the threat posed by the particular offer as a trigger
to whether the board or the shareholders would resolve the fate of a hostile bid.
Then in Time-Warner and Unitrin it was admonished for doing precisely that.
The Supreme Court's and Lipton's ideology displaced the Chancery Court's
pragmatism.
55. See Gilson, supra note 33, at 499-500.
56. Chancery Court quoted in Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1377.
57. Id. at 1390.
58. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
59. In Cheff, the Supreme Court held that a threat to change the target board's unique product
distribution system was sufficient to justify defensive action without any inquiry into the nature of
that distribution system to allow the court to assess the seriousness of the threat. Id. at 556. That
unique distribution system involved using door to door salesmen who dismantled the furnaces of
elderly homeowners pursuant to an offer of a free inspection, and then refused to reassemble them,
telling the homeowner that the furnace was too dangerous. Of course, being left without a furnace
often led to the sale of a new furnace. This strategy was held to be fraudulent by the FTC, and the
company's failure to follow a consent order led to a prosecution for criminal contempt. See In re
Holland Furnace Co., 341 E2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965).
60. Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 104 n.9.
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But what was the Chancery Court to do then? Responding to the Supreme
Court's direction in Unocal, Chancery had seen in a number of cases that target
companies systematically overreached on defensive tactics. Yet it was rebuffed by
the Supreme Court for following directions laid down by the Supreme Court itself
in light of the facts of the cases. It is easy to imagine the development of tension
between the appellate court's pronouncement of abstract principles and a trial
court's observation of the harsh facts of defensive tactics. In our view, Time-Warner
and Unitrin created rather than dissipated that tension. From time to time it
resurfaces in response to particularly egregious target company behavior, as in
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,61 or in response to particularly exaggerated conduct by
lawyers, as in the Chancery Court's admonition in Pure that "[i] f our law trusts
stockholders to protect themselves in the case of a [non-coercive] controlling
stockholder tender offer .... this will obviously be remembered by advocates in
cases involving defenses against similarly non-coercive third-party tender offers."
62
For better or for worse, Lipton (and Takeover Bids) deserve both the credit and
the blame for this tension. Lipton ultimately persuaded the Supreme Court that
the problem of allocating discretion between the board and shareholders in hostile
takeovers could be resolved by abstract principles-but only after the Chancery
Court was so far down the road to a pragmatic takeover jurisprudence that it
could no longer turn a blind eye to the facts.
1II. WHERE ARE WE Now? BURKE VERSUS SCHUMPETER
It is now 25 years since Takeover. Bids, 20 years since the Unocal/Household
International/Revlon trilogy, and 10 years since Unitrin. What standard governs
target management's discretion to deploy defensive tactics now?
A familiar answer is that legal rules no longer matter. Over the period spanned
by these milestones, the capital markets have changed more dramatically than the
law. A majority of the outstanding stock of most public corporations is now held
by institutional investors. 63 The voting policies of at least two large segments of
those investors are transparent. Large public pension funds openly challenge de-
fensive tactics that, in effect, go beyond the scope allowed as permissible by the
Chancery Court in Interco.6 Review of the voting policies of mutual funds, now
available on each fund's website, make apparent that the policies of mutual funds
on defensive tactics, though less public, do not differ in substance from those of
61. 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). Vice-Chancellor Strine's surgical dissection of Unitrin in this
opinion highlights at least his reluctance to follow the Supreme Court down the Unitrin path. The
Vice-Chancellor acknowledges "that there is some tension between some of my analysis and the
reasoning in Unitrin." Id. at 344.
62. In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421, 446 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002).
63. New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Factbook: Holdings of Corporate Equities in the U.S. (2005),
available at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer._edition.asp?mode = table&key = 2672&category
= 12.
64. See, e.g., CatPERS, CalPERS Releases 2004 Corporate Governance Focus List (Jun. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/archived/pr-2004/june/2004focus
list.xml (urging that Maytag seek shareholder approval for its poison pill, and complaining that the
company is "a model of an entrenched board").
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the public pension funds.65 It is not far fetched to claim that, were a shareholder
vote to be required, very few firms now could secure approval of a broadly framed
poison pill.
Put simply, the argument is that the capital market will no longer tolerate a just
say no defense, so whether the Delaware Supreme Court will allow it is irrelevant.
So posed, this analysis is a powerful counterpoint to that of Part II. There we
acknowledged that Lipton won the legal battle. While leaving the Chancery Court
somewhat sullen and potentially rebellious, the Supreme Court bought Lipton's
Burkean platform hook, line and sinker-"just say no" survived at least rhetori-
cally Today, however, it is sometimes argued that Lipton's victory was a hollow
one. As Chief Judge David Bazelon once characterized a focus on the slogan rather
than the outcome, "while the generals are designing a new insignia for the stan-
dard, the battle is being lost in the trenches."6 6 Which view is right?
This assessment requires looking a little harder at the types of takeovers in-
volved. The takeovers Lipton anticipated with such dismay in 1979 would be
driven by outsiders-Drexel's development of the junk bond market to fund
takeovers expanded the range of both bidders and targets and, as a result, ex-
panded the range of possible transactions. The new bidders were outsiders-think
of the Rales brothers in Interco. The new targets were old line companies who had
become conglomerates-think of pre-takeover Revlon having expanded into
health care. And the new transactions involved breaking up the target, in effect
dismantling conglomerate organizations that proved to be inefficient. Ron Perel-
man bought Revlon for $2.3 billion, and then sold off the health care and other
non-cosmetic businesses for $2.06 billion. He also received an offer for the re-
maining cosmetic business of $905 million.6 7
What we saw, and what Lipton feared, was Schumpeter's "perennial gale of
creative destruction."68 For Schumpeter, the essence of capitalism is not the or-
dinary competition that goes on within an existing industry structure-incre-
mental changes in prices, quality or products that leave the underlying market-
place unchanged. Rather, economic progress comes from revolutionary changes
that subvert the ancien regime. As Schumpeter put it, "the problem that is usually
being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the
relevant problem is how it creates and destroys them."69 From this perspective,
65. See, e.g. American Century Investments, Proxy Voting Policies (2005), available at http://www.
americancentury.com/services/guide/proxy.jsp; Fidelity Investments, Corporate Governance and Proxy
Guidelines (2005), available at http://personal.fidelitycom/myfidelity/nsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/
governance.shtml; Vanguard, Vanguard's Proxy Voting Guidelines (2005), available at http://flagship5.
vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/content/Home/WhyVanguard/AboutVanguardProxyVotingGuidelines
Content.jsp (displaying a general tendency to vote against anti-takeover measures, although allowing
for case-by-case approval in certain circumstances).
66. U.S. v. Brawner, 471 E2d 969, 1012 (D.C. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J. concurring).
67. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 Sci. 745, 746-747
(Aug. 17, 1990), available at 1990 WLNR 2426624.
68. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMocRAcY 84 (Harper Torchbooks, 1950).
69. Id.
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1980s junk bond financed, bust up takeovers reversed in record time a decade
of bad acquisitions-outsider, not insider capitalism.
70
And what of today's hostile takeovers, those in which the market is said to
render defensive tactics irrelevant? At the risk of over simplification, these are
Burkean takeovers, strategic transactions involving market or product extensions
effected by establishment companies or, like Wachtel, Lipton's unusual venture
on behalf of a bidder in a hostile takeover, ATT's effort to revitalize its computer
expertise by acquiring NCR. If the 1980s hostile takeovers were the gale of creative
destruction, today's hostile takeovers are just a process of peer review.
So where does that leave us? Did the market snatch back Lipton's legal victory?
We fear not. The answer turns on a prediction about whether legal rules would
trump the market if the character of the bidder reverted to the outsiders of the
1980s. It is one thing to see Oracle succeed in a hostile bid for PeopleSoft, 7I quite
another if the takeovers are intended to restructure an entire industry from the
outside. Steven Fraidin, a perceptive and experienced observer of the takeover
market, has argued, in effect, that Lipton has won even if judicially sanctioned
defensive tactics cannot block peer review takeovers.
72
The issue is Burke versus Schumpeter. For Lipton the problem is not hostile
takeovers, but only hostile takeovers that transmit the gale of creative destruction,
that represent a threat to the established order. Fraidin's view is that incumbent
managers may be able to buck the market if the bidder is a genuine outsider, and
that the legal rules as envisioned, if not ever quite stated, by the Delaware Supreme
Court, would give target managers virtually unlimited discretion to just say no to
whoever will be the new millennium's equivalent of T. Boone Pickens. 73 Put some-
what differently, suppose outsider bidders like the Rales brothers sought to acquire
a major corporation today If the consideration was partially junk bonds and the
bidders had no experience running a major corporation, would blocking the bid
be within Untrin's range of reasonableness and would establishment directors be
willing to take the heat from the market?
It may be that we will have the chance to learn the answer. A new generation
of takeover outsiders, in the form of hedge funds, appears to be on the horizon.
The recent bid for Circuit City by a hedge fund, 74 as well as the reported heavy
involvement of hedge funds in the contest between Qwest and Verizon for MCI,75
may presage a replay of the 1980s.76 And then the Supreme Court will have to
70. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 161 (1992).
71. C/Net News, Oracle Takeover: It's a Wrap, available at http://news.com.com/Oracle + takeover
+ Its + a + wrap/2100-1014_3-5516752.html.
72. Personal conversation with author.
73. Personal conversation with author.
74. Gary McWilliams & Gregory Zuckerman, Circuit City Draws $3.25 Billion Bid: Highfield Offer
Signals New Shareholder Influence by Hedge Fund Managers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at A3.
75. Jesse Eisinger, Subplot in Contest for MCI: Fast Money vs. the Long Term, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9,
2005, at Cl.
76. Lipton himself raises the possibility of private equity funds fueling a new wave of outsider
hostile takeovers. See Client Letter from Martin Lipton, Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Dec. 27,
2004) (on file with The Business Lawyer).
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consider its options yet again. Will it line up with Burke and serve as the protector
of the business aristocracy, or will it make some room for the creatively destructive
transactions that, for Schumpeter, were at the core of a successful capitalism?
IV. CONCLUSION
The decade from late 1970s to the late 1980s was a period of profound move-
ment toward the market in the culture, politics, and economics of America as well
as the rest of the world. In the United States, the resurgence of market-friendly
values led to the deregulation movement and contributed to the Reagan revolution
in politics. In the wider world, markets enjoyed a renaissance in the popular
imagination during this period, with the collapse of socialism in former Eastern-
block countries and the spread of "creeping capitalism" throughout the developing
world. Much of this activity was truly revolutionary And one important aspect of
the rise of markets in the U.S. was the surge of hostile takeovers and leveraged
buyouts that washed away so many of the failed conglomerates that had coalesced
during the previous decade. This was "creative destruction" in the best sense of
the phrase.
As Burke knew full well, however, revolutions are profoundly unsettling not
least because their endpoints are difficult to predict. They can easily spill over
from creative destruction to what some would say is destruction pure and simple.
The 1980s threatened entrenched elites around the world. In some jurisdictions,
the threat was fully realized. Thus, entire generations of managers simply vanished
in formerly socialist countries, as the market restructured the economic landscape.
In other jurisdictions including the United States, surges in the market for cor-
porate control were tamed and channeled after they had achieved much-needed
restructuring, but well before they could seriously threaten the established eco-
nomic elite. For better or worse, Martin Lipton-and the positions first developed
in Takeover Bids-played an important role in reigning in market forces that were
briefly unleashed during the 1980s. Few lawyers-and few articles-have had
anything like this effect. Burke would have approved.
